Agricultural Policy as a Barrier to Global Economic Integration
While the benefits from specialization in production and international exchange have been recognized for millennia, most governments restrict international trade to some extent, especially in agricultural goods. Sometimes it would be via export taxes, to raise government revenue or to lower the price of food for domestic consumers. More commonly it takes the form of import duties or bans. While food security concerns are sometimes mentioned as a reason for intervention in both sets of countries, for advanced economies the most likely reason for farm trade restrictions in the past century or more has been to protect domestic producers from import competition as they come under competitive pressure to shed labor in the course of economic development. In the process those protective measures hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. For many decades agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income (and some middle-income) countries have been depressing international prices of farm products, which lowers the earnings of farmers and associated rural businesses in developing countries. That worsened between the 1950s and the early 1980s (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986) , thereby adding to global inequality and poverty because three-quarters of the world's poorest people depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their main income (World Bank 2008) .
In addition to this external policy influence on rural poverty, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century. A well-known example is the taxing of exports of plantation crops in post-colonial Africa (Bates 1981) . At the same time, many developing countries chose also to pursue an import-substituting industrialization strategy, predominantly by restricting imports of manufactures, and to overvalue their currency. Together those measures indirectly taxed producers of other tradable products in developing economies, by far the most numerous of them being farmers Valdés 1988, 1991) .
Thus the global integration of markets for farm products has been reduced by policies of both high-income and developing countries. This disarray in world agriculture, as D. Gale Johnson (1991) described it in the title of his seminal book, means there has been overproduction of farm products in high-income countries and under-production in more-needy developing countries. It also means there has been less international trade in farm products than would be the case under free trade, thereby thinning markets for these weatherdependent products and thus making them more volatile. Using a stochastic model of world food markets, Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.14) found that instability of international food prices in the early 1980s was three times greater than it would have been under free trade in those products.
During the past quarter century, however, numerous countries have begun to reform their agricultural price and trade policies. To get a sense of how much that has increased the integration of global markets for farm products, the present chapter draws on the results of the recent World Bank multi-country study of distortions to agricultural price incentives over the past 5 decades. That study includes 75 countries that together account for 92 percent of the world's population and agricultural GDP and 95 percent of total GDP. The sample countries also account for more than 85 percent of farm production and employment in each of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, and their spectrum of per capita incomes ranges from among the poorest (Zimbabwe and Ethiopia) to among the richest (Norway). it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which a country's sectoral policy regime has an anti-(pro-)agricultural bias.
Also considered is the extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, a
Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) is calculated by comparing the price that consumers pay for their food and the international price of each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE arise from distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those received by producers. In the absence of any other information, the CTE for each tradable farm product is assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions.
The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend to be greater the greater the degree of substitution in production. In the case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm activities, the greater the variation of NRAs across industries within the sector then the higher will be the welfare cost of those market interventions. A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard deviation of the covered industries' NRAs.
However, it would be helpful to have a single indicator to capture the overall welfare effect of each country's regime of agricultural price distortions in place at any time (taking 2 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables. Figure 2 also reveals that the NRA for import-competing farmers in developing countries has increased at virtually the same pace as that in high-income countries. This suggests that growth in agricultural protection is something that begins at relatively low levels of per capita income rather than being a phenomenon exclusive to high-income countries.
The improvement in farmers' incentives in developing countries is understated by the above NRA estimates, because those countries have also reduced their assistance to producers of non-agricultural tradable goods, most notably manufactures. The decline in the weighted average NRA for the latter, depicted in Figure 3 , was clearly much greater than the increase in the average NRA for tradable agricultural sectors for the period to the mid-1980s, consistent with the finding two decades ago of Valdés (1988, 1991) . For the period since the mid-1980s, changes in the NRAs of both sectors have contributed almost equally to the improvement in incentives to farmers. The RRA, defined in the previous section, provides a useful indicator of relative price change: the RRA for developing countries as a group went from −46 per cent in the second half of the 1970s to 1 per cent in the first half of the present decade. This increase (from a coefficient of 0.54 to 1.01) is equivalent to an almost doubling in the relative price of farm products, which is a huge change in the fortunes of developing country farmers in just a generation. This is mostly because of the changes in Asia, but this relative price hike even for Latin America is one-half, while for Africa this indicator improves by only one-eighth. As for high-income countries, assistance to manufacturing was on average much less than assistance to farmers, even in the 1950s, and its decline since then has had only a minor impact on that group's average RRA indicate that the trade-reducing impact of agricultural policies for developing countries as a group was roughly constant until the early 1990s and thereafter it declined, while for highincome countries the decline in TRI began a few years later (Figure 4(a) ). The TRI for developing countries is driven by the exportables subsector which was being taxed until recently and the import-competing subsector which was and is increasingly being protected (albeit less than in high-income countries -see Figure 2 above). For high-income countries, policies have supported both exporting and import-competing agricultural products and, even though they strongly favor the latter, the assistance to exporters has offset somewhat the antitrade bias from the protection of import-competing producers.
The WRI estimates for agricultural policies, shown in Figure Sixth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in agriculture) is estimated to be 4.9 per cent higher than it would have been without the reforms of the past quarter century, which is more than ten times the proportional reform gain in nonagricultural value added. If the price and trade policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm incomes in developing countries would rise a further 5.6 per cent, compared with just 1.9 per cent for non-agricultural value added. In addition, unskilled workers in developing countries -the majority of whom work on farms -would see their returns rise more than returns on other productive factors from that liberalization. Together, these findings suggest that both inequality and poverty could be alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world's poor are farmers in developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008) .
Prospects for further agricultural reform
The reasons why some countries have reformed their price-distorting agricultural and trade policies more than others in recent decades are varied. Some have reformed unilaterally, apparently having become convinced that it is in their own national interest to do so. China is the most dramatic and significant example of the past three decades among developing countries, and Australia and New Zealand among the high-income countries ( Table 1 .2).
Another indicator of reluctance about agricultural trade reform is the demand by many developing countries to be allowed to maintain their rates of agricultural protection for reasons of food security, livelihood security and rural development. This view has succeeded in bringing 'special products' and a 'special safeguard mechanism' into the multilateral trading system's agricultural negotiations, even though such policies, which would raise domestic food prices in developing countries, may worsen poverty and reduce the food security of the poor (Ivanic and Martin 2008) , and would exacerbate instability in international markets for farm products.
Those developing economies that continue to free up domestic markets and practice good macroeconomic governance will keep growing. Typically the growth will be more rapid in manufacturing and service activities than in agriculture, especially in the more densely Given this need to tighten the constraints on agricultural protection and assistance policies, it is especially unfortunate that the WTO's Doha Development Agenda is struggling to deliver a new agreement, and makes it more likely that developing countries will follow the same agricultural protection path this century as that taken last century by high-income countries.
There are some relatively new forces at work that have recently, and will continue to raise international prices of farm products above what they would otherwise be, and thus reduce the NRAs of countries that maintain constant domestic prices. One is the emergence of demand for biofuels, which is driven largely by subsidies and mandates in the United
States and EU (whose NRA equivalents have yet to be calculated for those countries).
Another is the growth of demand for protein-rich foods (e.g., livestock products) in rapidly emerging economies such as China. Global climate change also is expected to raise the mean (and variance) of international prices of farm products, thereby raising the denominator of the domestic-to-border price ratio. By contrast, the emergence of the new biotechnologies that provide genetically modified (GM) foods, feedstuffs, fibres and biofuels are helping to lower international food prices -although not in those countries that are banning the production and importation of GM farm products. Such bans purportedly are for local food safety and environmental reasons, although countries that have adopted and export GM crops suspect these new protective measures also have a traditional economic protective motive. Regardless of the rationale for those bans, the new biotechnologies on the one hand are providing lowercost (and potentially higher quality and less-pollutive) farm products in those developing countries that share the view of current adopters that this is a benign technology. 6 On the other hand, until there is general acceptance of GM technology globally this issue is going to be a force that fragments the world into two parts: the group of countries that accept the technology and enjoy lower-priced farm products, and the residual set of countries where consumers will have to continue paying higher prices for their food. 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 Import-competing Exportables Total 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 Import-competing Exportables Total a Covered products only. The total also includes nontradables.
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